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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
Nos. 18-2807 and 18-2901  
____________ 
 
POCONO MOUNTAIN SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
                                                                        Appellant in 18-2807 
                                                                       
v. 
 
T.D., a minor; S.D.L., as Parent and Legal Guardian of T.D., 
                                                                      Appellants in 18-2901 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-15-cv-00764) 
District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani 
____________ 
 
Argued April 30, 2019 
 
Before:  RESTREPO, ROTH and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: October 29, 2019) 
 
 
John E. Freund, III  [ARGUED] 
Glenna M. Hazeltine 
King Spry Herman Freund & Faul 
One West Broad Street, Suite 700 
Bethlehem, PA 18018 
 Counsel for Pocono Mountain School District 
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Michael E. Gehring  [ARGUED] 
Dennis C. McAndrews 
McAndrews Law Offices 
30 Cassatt Avenue 
Berwyn, PA 19312 
Counsel for T.D., a minor and S.D.L., as Parent and Legal Guardian of T.D. 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Several behavioral and educational issues arose for student T.D. after an incident 
with another student during his time in the Pocono Mountain School District (“Pocono” 
or “the District”). After years of disagreement between T.D.’s mother and Pocono on 
how to respond to T.D.’s issues, she enrolled him in private school and filed a due 
process claim against Pocono. A Special Education Hearing Officer (the “Hearing 
Officer”) granted private-school tuition reimbursement and compensatory education 
under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, but denied 
eligibility under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 
1400−82. The District Court found T.D. was also eligible under the IDEA and affirmed 
the Hearing Officer’s award of tuition reimbursement under the IDEA rather than § 504. 
T.D. and Pocono each appeal aspects of the District Court decision. Because claims 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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related to tuition reimbursement are moot and the only otherwise-live issue on appeal was 
waived, we will vacate in part and affirm in part.  
I. 
In December 2011, third-grader T.D. was inappropriately touched by a female 
student at a Pocono elementary school. For the remainder of third grade and all of fourth 
grade, T.D. exhibited behavioral and educational issues in the classroom and at home. 
The parties had several tests and evaluations done over this time but could not agree on 
whether T.D. was eligible for special education services under the IDEA and § 504.  
Unable to reach an agreement with Pocono, T.D.’s mother enrolled him in private school 
for the 2013−14 school year. T.D. remained in private school until the 2018−19 school 
year when he re-enrolled in the District.  
During T.D.’s first year of private school, his mother filed a due process claim on 
his behalf, seeking compensatory education for past violations of § 504 and the IDEA 
and private-school tuition reimbursement.  The Hearing Officer found that T.D. was 
eligible for relief under § 504 and awarded twenty-six hours of compensatory education 
and tuition reimbursement,*  but determined that he was not eligible for special education 
services under the IDEA. The Hearing Officer specifically found that Pocono acted with 
                                              
* Pocono asserts that, during the pendency of these proceedings, it continued to 
pay T.D.’s tuition beyond the two years granted by the Hearing Officer. T.D. does not 
dispute that fact. 
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deliberate indifference to T.D.’s situation, opening the door to tuition reimbursement 
under § 504. Both parties appealed the adverse aspects of the decision to the District 
Court. A magistrate judge recommended affirmance on all issues in his Report and 
Recommendation. 
The District Court agreed that T.D. was entitled to compensatory education under 
§ 504 but found that Pocono did not act with the requisite deliberate indifference for a 
tuition reimbursement award under § 504. The court instead found that T.D. was eligible 
for special education services, including tuition reimbursement, under the IDEA. Pocono 
and T.D. appeal.   
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2), 
and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We generally have jurisdiction to review the court’s grant of 
judgment on the administrative record pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
III. 
A. 
Before we may consider the merits of the parties’ claims, this Court must “satisfy 
itself of its jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 
U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 95 
(1998)). To decide a case on the merits “when [we have] no jurisdiction to do so is, by 
very definition, for [this] [C]ourt to act ultra vires.” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101−02.  
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Though we generally have jurisdiction to review a district court’s grant of 
judgment on the administrative record, Article III of the Constitution provides that courts 
“may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies.” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 
(1988) (citing Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546 (1976); Preiser v. Newkirk, 
422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975)). “Accordingly, if ‘developments occur during the course of 
adjudication that eliminate a plaintiffs [sic] personal stake in the outcome of a suit or 
prevent a court from being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be dismissed 
as moot.” D.F. v. Collingswood Borough Bd. of Educ., 694 F.3d 488, 496 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(quoting Cty. of Morris v. Nationalist Movement, 273 F.3d 527, 533 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
In this case, both issues raised by the parties—the correctness of the District 
Court’s IDEA eligibility determination and its finding that Pocono did not act with 
deliberate indifference under § 504—are related to tuition reimbursement and are 
therefore moot. Pocono paid for T.D.’s private school tuition for the entirety of his time 
at the school. T.D. then returned to the District. Pocono does not seek to recoup its costs 
related to its private-school tuition reimbursement. There is no more than the “mere 
physical or theoretical possibility,” Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982), that these 
issues will reoccur for T.D., so the issues do not fall under the “capable of repetition, yet 
evading review” exception to mootness. Id. Neither party has a personal stake in the 
outcome of the claims related to tuition reimbursement, and the relevant issues are moot.  
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Because the District Court’s IDEA eligibility determination and its deliberate 
indifference finding bear only on the tuition reimbursement award, we will vacate the 
District Court’s determinations on those issues. See Lightner ex rel. NLRB v. 1621 Route 
22 W. Operating Co., LLC, 729 F.3d 235, 237 (3d Cir. 2013) (“When a civil case 
becomes moot while an appeal is pending, the normal practice is to vacate the district 
court judgment . . . prevent[ing] ‘a judgment, unreviewable because of mootness, from 
spawning any legal consequences.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Rendell v. Rumsfeld, 484 
F.3d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 2007))). 
B. 
 In its reply brief, Pocono argues that the District Court incorrectly awarded 
twenty-six hours of compensatory education under § 504 without a deliberate 
indifference finding. Pocono failed to raise this issue in its opening brief, so the issue is 
waived, see In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 237 (3d Cir. 2003), and the District Court’s 
award of twenty-six hours of compensatory education under § 504 will be affirmed. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s IDEA determination 
and deliberate indifference finding and affirm its award of compensatory education under 
§ 504.  
